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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DIANA CHILDS, 
(fka Diane Callahan) 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
vs. 
WILLIAM K. CALLAHAN, 
Respondent/ Appellee. 
Case No. 990051-CA 
Priority 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
The Appellant, Diana Childs, pursuant to Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, submits this Appeal Brief. 
Statement of Jurisdiction 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-
3(2)(h) 1953, as amended. The order appealed from is a final order disposing of all claims of 
the parties. 
Statement of Issues 
Presented by Appellant 
Appellant presents the following issues for this Court's review: 
1. Did the trial court err in holding that Toone v. Toone, 952 P.2d 112 (Utah 
App. 1998), precluded a modification of the Decree of Divorce to award the Petitioner/Appellant 
(hereinafter "Petitioner") a share of that portion of the Respondent/Appellee's (hereinafter 
"Respondent") military retirement which accrued to him during the marriage in spite of the 
implementation language of the Uniform Services Former Spouses' Protection Act (hereinafter 
"USFSPA") 10 USCA § 1401? 
2. Did the trial court err in ruling, as a matter of law, that the Petitioner, 
whose divorce decree was entered during the "gap" period between the McCartv decision and 
the effective date of the USFSPA, was not entitled to retroactive application of USFSPA as 
provided in 10 USCA § 1401(c)(1)? 
3. Did the trial court err in holding that the Respondent's post-decree return 
to military service and subsequent entitlement to a military retirement, which utilized thirteen 
(13) years of active duty service that had accrued to him during the parties' marriage, was not 
a substantial change in circumstances which warranted a modification of the Decree as provided 
under the USFSPA? 
Standard of Appellate Review 
The granting of a Motion to Dismiss is appropriate only when there are no issues of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 
56(c), Higgins v. County, 855 P.2d 235 (Utah 1984). The Court of Appeals reviews the trial 
court's conclusions of law for correctness, granting them no deference. Ferree v. State, 784 
2 
P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989). On appeal, the Court of Appeals determines only whether the trial 
court erred in applying the governing law and whether the "trial court correctly held that there 
were no disputed issues of material fact". IcL In reviewing the trial court's decision, the Court 
of Appeals views the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and will find 
summary judgment, or a Motion to Dismiss, proper only when there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Utah Rules 
of Civ. P. 56(c). Drvsdale v. Ford Motor Company, 947 P.2d 678, 680 (Utah 1997). 
Determinative Authorities 
A. Federal Statutes: The Uniform Services Former Spouses' Protection Act, 
10 USCA § 1401, et seq., legislatively overrides the U.S. Supreme Court decision in McCarty 
v. McCartv. 453 U.S. 210, 101 S.Ct. 2728, 69 L.Ed.2 583 (U.S. 1981). As a result of the 
passage of the USFSPA, military retirements are allocable as part of the divorce proceedings. 
The relevant portion of the USFSPA is 10 USCA § 1401(c)(1) which relates to divorce decrees 
that were entered between June 26, 1981, and February 1, 1983, the effective date of the 
USFSPA. That period of time is generally known as the "gap" period of the USFSPA. 
B. Utah Statutes: The primary statutory provision regarding the allocation 
or property in a divorce action is U.C.A. § 30-3-5, et seq., (1953), as amended. 
C. Utah Case Law: In making its determination, the trial court referred to 
the Utah Court of Appeals decision in Toone v. Toone. 952 P.2d 112 (Utah App. 1998). That 
case held that enactment of the Uniform Services Former Spouses' Protection Act was a change 
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in the law which, in itself, could not be considered a substantial change in circumstances which 
would allow modification of a Divorce Decree to allocate the retirement benefits to Petitioner 
as would otherwise be provided under the USFSPA. 
Statement of Case 
A. Nature of Case. This is an appeal from a final order of the Second 
Judicial District Court, Honorable Roger Dutson, which granted Respondent's Motion to 
Dismiss. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. 
Petitioner filed a Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce, based upon a substantial 
change of circumstances, which was the vesting of the Respondent's military retirement 
subsequent to the divorce, as well as the enactment of the USFSPA which allowed for a division 
of the Respondent's military retirement. 
The Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(6), or in the 
alternative, 12(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
C. Disposition in Trial Court. 
The trial court, over Petitioner's objections and affidavits in opposition, granted the 
Respondent's Motion to Dismiss. 
D. Statement of Relevant Facts. 
1. The Decree of Divorce was issued on March 10, 1982. 
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2. The Decree addressed the issues of custody, alimony and property, 
but the issue of Respondent's military retirement could not be addressed at the time of the 
Decree because: 1) the U.S. Supreme Court decision of McCartv v. McCartv, 453 U.S. 210 101 
S.Ct. 2728, 69 L.Ed2 589 (U.S. 1981), which precluded allocation of military retirement by 
state courts in cases of divorce; and, 2) the Respondent was not vested, and because of his non-
affiliation with any military reserve unit apparently had no possibility of becoming vested, in a 
military retirement, at the time the Decree of Divorce was entered. (R.001; R.033; R.051; 
R.058) 
3. At the time the Decree of Divorce was entered, Respondent had 
separated from the U.S. Marine Corps after having accumulated thirteen (13) years towards the 
minimum of twenty (20) years required before he could retire from the military. (R.002; R.057) 
4. At the time of the divorce, Respondent had been separated from the 
military for about three (3) years and had not participated in any military or reserve activity 
which would earn him the necessary credit towards military retirement. (R. 051) 
5. In 1985, the parties returned to Court to have the Respondent's 
child support obligation modified. At that time, Petitioner had no knowledge that Respondent 
had participated in any reserve military activities that would earn him credit towards military 
retirement. (R. 028; R.034) 
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6. From the date of the Decree of Divorce until January 1998, 
Petitioner was unaware that she might be entitled to one-half of the portion of Respondent's 
military retirement benefits which had accrued during the parties' marriage. (R.002; R.028) 
7. After having become aware, through reading a newspaper article, 
that she might be entitled to a portion of Respondent's military retirement benefits, Petitioner 
made efforts to contact an attorney who might be qualified to represent her in this matter. After 
speaking with three attorneys who did not feel qualified to deal with such a specialized matter, 
Petitioner was referred to her current attorneys, all of whom are military reservists and familiar 
with military retirement issues. (R.002; R.058; R.059) 
8. It appears that Respondent is now qualified to receive military 
retirement benefits, having participated in reserve military activities since the Decree of Divorce 
was entered. While Respondent will not actually receive military retirement benefits until his 
60th birthday, in June 2003, it appears that he is now vested in those military retirement 
benefits, having served in the active or reserve military for at least twenty (20) years. (R.051, 
R.058) 
9. Because the Petitioner's Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce 
was dismissed by the Court, she was denied the opportunity to further develop through discovery 
the factual basis for this and other relevant changes of circumstances which would entitle her to 
a modification of the Decree of Divorce. (R. 141-145) 
6 
Summary of Arguments 
Summary judgment, or a Motion to Dismiss, should be granted only when the evidence, 
considered in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, demonstrates that there are no 
genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. The grounds considered by the court in granting the Respondent's Motion to Dismiss in 
this case are that 1) relying on Toone, a change in the law, in this case the USFSPA, does not 
constitute a "substantial change in circumstances" such as would justify a modification of a 
decree of divorce; 2) that the policy of res judicata governs in this matter, in that the claims of 
the Petitioner should have been presented prior to her current Petition to Modify Decree of 
Divorce; and, 3) that there were no other grounds constituting a "substantial change in 
circumstances" which would justify a modification of the Decree of Divorce. 
However, the facts in Toone can be distinguished because 1) the Decree of Divorce in 
Toone was entered some ten (10) months after the implementation of the USFSPA and the 
Petitioner in that case could have raised the issue of military retirement at the time of the 
divorce; 2) the court in Toone did allocate retirement benefits, but petitioner/appellant did not 
address the issue of Mr. Toone's military retirement; and, 3) Mr. Toone was qualified to receive 
military retirement at the time of the Decree of Divorce, whereas Respondent in this matter was 
not so qualified at the time of the Decree of Divorce. 
Furthermore, in Masters v. Worslev, 777 P.2d 499 (Utah App. 1989), this Court held 
that, where the moving party had no knowledge of the facts surrounding his claim at the time 
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of trial, res judicata did not bar the pursuit of the matter on a modification. When the Decree 
of Divorce in this matter was entered the Respondent/Appellee was not currently affiliated with 
the military and had no prospect of becoming entitled to a military retirement. It appeared that 
any military retirement was a dead issue at the time of the divorce. When a Petition to Modify 
the Decree was made by the Petitioner in 1985, there was no mention of any current military 
service by the Respondent. Between that time and 1998, Petitioner learned that Respondent was 
now a Lieutenant Colonel and had therefore obviously participated in a military Reserve 
program. It was only in 1998, when the Petitioner learned of the USFSPA and her right to 
share in the Respondent's military retirement, that she expeditiously sought counsel and the filing 
of a Petition to Modify the Decree. 
Finally, regardless of the change of law represented by USFSPA, Respondent's post-
decree re-affiliation with the military and apparent entitlement to a retirement which is based in 
substantial part on the 13 years of active duty service that accrued during the marriage represents 
a "substantial change" in circumstances which should be the basis for modifying the decree 
utilizing the procedures set forth in USFSPA for that purpose. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE UNIFORMED SERVICES FORMER SPOUSES' 
PROTECTION ACT (USFSPA) ALLOWS FOR 
THE APPELLANT TO RECEIVE A PORTION 
OF THE APPELLEE'S MILITARY 
RETIREMENT BENEFITS 
InMcCartvv. McCartv, 453 U.S. 210, 101 S.Ct. 2728, 69L.Ed.2 583 (U.S. 1981), the 
Supreme Court held that a state court could award an interest in a retired military officer's 
retirement to a former spouse as a division of property in a divorce action. 
In response to McCarty, Congress passed the Uniform Services Former Spouses' 
Protection Act, which permitted the States to divide and distribute military retirement benefits 
in divorce actions according to State law. 10 USCA § 1408(c)(1); S.Rep. No. 97-502, U.S. 
Code, Cong. & Admin. News 1982 (July 22, 1982). Section 1408(c)(1) of the Act specifically 
provides for retroactive application of the Act with respect to divorce decrees entered during the 
period between McCartv and the date that the Act became effective. 
Petitioner in this matter received her divorce decree squarely within the period of time 
for which retroactive application was intended by Congress - the so-called "gap" period. 
Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982) allows for the division and 
distribution of retirement funds that accrued during the marriage. As such, the Petitioner should 
have been granted a modification of her Decree of Divorce giving her a portion of the 
Respondent's military retirement pay earned during the marriage. 
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While in Woodward, the Utah Supreme Court made no provision for the retroactive 
application of the new legal concept, the USFSPA specifically allowed such retroactive 
application for decrees that were entered within the "gap" period between McCartv and the 
USFSPA. The Petitioner's Decree of Divorce falls squarely within this "gap" period. Petitioner 
is clearly a member of the class of persons which Congress intended to benefit from the 
retroactive application of the USFSPA. 
POINT H 
TOONE IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE 
FACTS OF TfflS CASE 
1. In Toone, the Decree of Divorce was entered on December 16, 1983, 
some ten months after the effective date of the USFSPA and after the closure of the "gap" for 
which retroactive application of the statute was provided. 
In this case, the Decree of Divorce was granted on March 10, 1982 - squarely within 
that "gap" period. 
2. In Toone, the petitioner/appellant raised the issue of retirement, but did 
not address the military retirement. 
In this case, because McCartv was the law at the time, the Petitioner was precluded 
from raising the issue of military retirement. 
3. In Toone, Mr. Toone was eligible for military retirement at the time of 
the Decree of Divorce. 
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In this case, the Respondent/Appellee was not eligible for military retirement at the 
time of the Divorce and had no apparent intent to become so eligible until some time after 
the entry of the Decree. 
4. In Toone, this Court held that a change in the law was not a 
"substantial change of circumstance" which would justify the modification of a decree of 
divorce. The law which had changed was the Utah Supreme Court case of Woodward v. 
Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982) which established that civil service benefits were 
marital assets and were properly a subject of distribution in a divorce. In Woodward, the 
Utah Supreme Court made no provision for a retroactive application of the new legal 
concept. 
However, in this case, the USFSPA contains a specific provision which allows for a 
retroactive application of the statute for decrees that were entered within the "gap" period -
under which the Petitioner falls. Petitioner is clearly a member of the class of persons 
intended to benefit from the retroactive application of the USFSPA. 
5. In Toone the petitioner/appellant apparently relied solely on the change 
of law under the USFSPA as her "substantial change of circumstances" justifying a 
modification of the decree. Mr. Toone was already vested in his retirement when the decree 
was entered. 
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In this case, as set forth below in Section III of this Brief, the more compelling 
"substantial change in circumstance" is the vesting of retirement benefits in the Respondent 
after the Decree of Divorce. 
POINT ffl 
THE RETIREMENT OF THE APPELLEE SUBSEQUENT TO 
THE DECREE OF DIVORCE WAS A "SUBSTANTIAL 
CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES" ALLOWING FOR A MODIFICATION 
In order for a member of the military to be vested with military retirement benefits, 
they must have completed a minimum of twenty (20) years of creditable military service, 
either through full-time active duty service or part-time reserve service. 
In 1979, the Respondent separated from the U.S. Marine Corps, after serving on 
active duty for thirteen years. At the time that he separated from the military, he had not 
accrued enough creditable years to vest in any retirement benefits. When the parties in this 
action divorced in 1982, the Respondent was not then affiliated with the military in any 
capacity. 
Even if the Decree in this matter had been entered after USFSPA, the Petitioner 
would not have had any right to a portion of Respondent's military retirement because he did 
not, at the time, have any vested right to such military retirement. Since he was not 
affiliated with any military reserve at the time of the divorce there was no indication that he 
would ever vest in any military retirement. 
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However, at some time since 1985 the Respondent re-affiliated with the military and 
now appears to have reached the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in a branch of the military 
reserve forces. While the lower court's decision dismissing the Petitioner's Petition to 
Modify the Decree of Divorce precluded discovery on the issue, it appears, because of the 
rank that the Respondent has attained, that he now has at least twenty (20) years of creditable 
service toward a retirement. At a minimum, even if he has not earned the retirement to 
date, there is now a greater likelihood that he will vest in the retirement in the future. 
The fact that the Respondent had no prospect of reaching twenty (20) years of 
creditable military service at the time of the Decree of Divorce, but has reached that 
milestone subsequent to the divorce is, in itself, a "substantial change in circumstances" 
which would allow the Court to modify the Decree of Divorce and award a portion of that 
retirement to the Petitioner. 
POINT IV 
BECAUSE MCCARTY WAS THE LAW AT THE TIME 
OF THE DECREE OF DIVORCE IN THIS 
ACTION, THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA 
IS NOT APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE 
When the Decree of Divorce was entered in this case, McCartv was the law of the 
land. As a result, the Petitioner was precluded from asserting her right to a portion of the 
Respondent's military retirement at that time. 
Additionally, at the time that the Decree of Divorce was entered, the Petitioner did 
not have any right to a portion of the Respondent's military retirement because he did not 
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himself, at the time, have a vested right or the prospect of any future vested right to such 
military retirement. 
With regard to the issue of res judicata, this Court, in Masters v. Worslev, 777 P.2d 
499, 503 (Utah App. 1989) stated: 
Claim preclusion does not bar Masters' fraud claim because the issues have 
not been fully litigated in either the original divorce nor the petition for 
modification proceedings. Also, Masters' claim of non-paternity could not 
have been tried in the divorce because he had no knowledge of the alleged 
facts supporting his fpresentl claim. Therefore, res judicata does not justify 
the trial court's grant of summary judgment [against Masters]." (Emphasis 
added) 
Similarly, here the Petitioner did not have knowledge of any facts which support her 
present claim to the Respondent's military retirement because, at the time of the divorce, he 
had not vested in any military retirement and it appeared that he would not do so in the 
future. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent's Motion to Dismiss should not have been granted because there is a 
"substantial change in circumstance" which would justify a modification of the Decree of 
Divorce and the doctrine of res judicata is not applicable to the facts in this case. 
DATED this day of July, 1999. 
NEIL B. CRIST & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Appellant 
By: 
1JEONARD E. McGEE 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLANT to the following individual at the address shown, via first-class mail, postage 
prepaid on this ^ £ > day of July, 1999: 
David S. Dolowitz 
Attorney at Law 
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal 
525 East 100 South, 5th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
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ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT A Order signed by Judge Dutson December 18, 1998, and entered 
December 31, 1998 
Decree of Divorce 
EXHIBIT B Utah Code Annotated §30-3-5 (1953, as amended) 
Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3 (1953, as amended) 
10 USCA § 1401 
10 USCA § 1408 
16 
UT ST § 30-3-5, Disposition of property-Maintenanc 
children-Division of debts-Court to have continuing 
visitation-Determination of alimony-Nonmeritorious 
Utah Code § 30-3-5 
WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 30. HUSBAND AND WIFE 
CHAPTER 3. DIVORCE 
(Information regarding effective dates, 
repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in 
this document.) 
Current through End of 1998 General Sess. 
§ 30-3-5. Disposition of property-
Maintenance and health care of parties 
and children—Division of debts-Court 
to have continuing jurisdiction-
Custody and visitation—Determination 
of alimony-Nonmeritorious petition for 
modification 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the 
court may include in it equitable orders relating 
to the children, property, debts or obligations, 
and parties. The court shall include the 
following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the 
payment of reasonable and necessary medical 
and dental expenses of the dependent children; 
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a 
reasonable cost, an order requiring the purchase 
and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, 
and dental care insurance for the dependent 
children; 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is 
responsible for the payment of joint debts, 
obligations, or liabilities of the parties 
contracted or incurred during marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify 
respective creditors or obligees, regarding the 
court's division of debts, obligations, or 
Copyright (c) West Group 1998 N 
and health care of parties and Page 1 
irisdiction-Custody and 
etition for modification 
liabilities and regarding the parties' separate, 
current addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these 
orders; and 
(d) provisions for income withholding in 
accordance with Title 62 A, Chapter 11, 
Recovery Services. 
(2) The court may include, in an order 
determining child support, an order assigning 
financial responsibility for all or a portion of 
child care expenses incurred on behalf of the 
dependent children, necessitated by the 
employment or training of the custodial parent. 
If the court determines that the circumstances 
are appropriate and that the dependent children 
would be adequately cared for, it may include 
an order allowing the noncustodial parent to 
provide child care for the dependent children, 
necessitated by the employment or training of 
the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to 
make subsequent changes or new orders for the 
custody of the children and their support, 
maintenance, health, and dental care, and for 
distribution of the property and obligations for 
debts as is reasonable and necessary. 
*8559 (4)(a) In determining visitation rights of 
parents, grandparents, and other members of the 
immediate family, the court shall consider the 
best interest of the child. 
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the 
need for peace officer enforcement, the court 
may include in an order establishing a visitation 
schedule a provision, among other things, 
authorizing any peace officer to enforce a court 
ordered visitation schedule entered under this 
chapter. 
(5) If a petition for modification of child 
custody or visitation provisions of a court order 
is made and denied, the court shall order the 
claim to original U.S. Govt, works 
EXHIBIT A 
UT ST § 30-3-5, Disposition of property-Maintenance and health care of parties and 
children-Division of debts-Court to have continuing jurisdiction-Custody and 
visitation-Determination of alimony-Nonmeritonous petition for modification 
Page 2 
petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys' fees 
expended by the prevailing party m that action, 
if the court determines that the petition was 
without merit and not asserted or defended 
against in good faith. 
(6) If a petition alleges substantial 
noncompliance with a visitation order by a 
parent, a grandparent, or other member of the 
immediate family pursuant to Section 
78-32-12.2 where a visitation right has been 
previously granted by the court, the court may 
award to the prevailing party costs, including 
actual attorney fees and court costs incurred by 
the prevailing party because of the other party's 
failure to provide or exercise court-ordered 
visitation. 
(7)(a) The court shall consider at least the 
following factors m determining alimony: 
(I) the financial condition and needs of the 
recipient spouse; 
(n) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to 
produce income; 
(m) the ability of the payor spouse to provide 
support; and 
(IV) the length of the marriage. 
(b) The court may consider the fault of the 
parties m determining alimony. 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to 
the standard of living, existing at the time of 
separation, m determining alimony in 
accordance with Subsection (a). However, the 
court shall consider all relevant facts and 
equitable principles and may, m its discretion, 
base alimony on the standard of living that 
existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short 
duration, when no children have been conceived 
or born during the marriage, the court may 
consider the standard of living that existed at the 
time of the marriage. 
(d) The court may, under appropriate 
circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties' 
respective standards of living. 
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves 
on the threshold of a major change m the 
income of one of the spouses due to the 
collective efforts of both, that change shall be 
considered m dividing the marital property and 
m determining the amount of alimony. If one 
spouse's earning capacity has been greatly 
enhanced through the efforts of both spouses 
during the marriage, the court may make a 
compensating adjustment m dividing the marital 
property and awarding alimony. 
*8560 (f) In determining alimony when a 
marriage of short duration dissolves, and no 
children have been conceived or born during the 
marriage, the court may consider restoring each 
party to the condition which existed at the time 
of the marriage. 
(g)(i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to 
make substantive changes and new orders 
regarding alimony based on a substantial 
material change m circumstances not 
foreseeable at the time of the divorce. 
(n) The court may not modify alimony or issue 
a new order for alimony to address needs of the 
recipient that did not exist at the time the decree 
was entered, unless the court finds extenuating 
circumstances that justify that action. 
(in) In determining alimony, the income of any 
subsequent spouse of the payor may not be 
considered, except as provided m this 
subsection. 
(A) The court may consider the subsequent 
spouse's financial ability to share living 
expenses. 
(B) The court may consider the income of a 
subsequent spouse if the court finds that the 
Copyright (c) West Group 1998 No claim to original U S Govt works 
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payor's improper conduct justifies 
consideration. 
that 
the 
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration 
longer than the number of years that the 
marriage existed unless, at any time prior to 
termination of alimony, the court finds 
extenuating circumstances that justify i 
payment of alimony for a longer period of time. 
(8) Unless a decree of divorce specifically 
provides otherwise, any order of the court that a 
party pay alimony to a former spouse 
automatically terminates upon the remarriage of 
that former spouse. However, if the remarriage 
is annulled and found to be void ab initio, 
payment of alimony shall resume if the party 
paying alimony is made a party to the action of 
annulment and his rights are determined. 
(9) Any order of the court that a party pay 
alimony to a former spouse terminates upon 
establishment by the party paying alimony that 
the former spouse is cohabitatmg with another 
person. 
Amended by Laws 1994, c 284, Laws 1995, c 330, § 1, 
eff May 1, 1995, Laws 1997, c 232, § 4, eff July 1, 1997 
HISTORICAL NOTES 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Section 2 of Laws 1995, c 330 provides 
"It is not the intent of the Legislature that termination of 
alimony based on cohabitation with another person in 
accordance with Subsection 30-3-5(9), be interpreted in 
any way to condone such a relationship for any purpose " 
Search this disc for cases citing this section. 
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Utah Code § 78-2a-3 
WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE 
PARTI. COURTS 
CHAPTER 2A. COURT OF 
APPEALS 
(Information regarding effective dates, 
repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in 
this document.) 
Current through End of 1998 General Sess. 
§ 78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to 
issue all extraordinary writs and to issue all 
writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, 
and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate 
jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from 
formal adjudicative proceedings of state 
agencies or appeals from the district court 
review of informal adjudicative proceedings of 
the agencies, except the Public Service 
Commission, State Tax Commission, School 
and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, 
Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands 
actions reviewed by the executive director of the 
Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, 
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of 
political subdivisions of the state or other local 
agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 
Copyright (c) West Group 1998 
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63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of 
record in criminal cases, except those involving 
a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal 
cases, except those involving a conviction of a 
first degree or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for 
extraordinary writs sought by persons who are 
incarcerated or serving any other criminal 
sentence, except petitions constituting a 
challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a 
first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for 
extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of 
the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases 
involving a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving 
domestic relations cases, including, but not 
limited to, divorce, annulment, property 
division, child custody, support, visitation, 
adoption, and paternity; 
*25945 (i) appeals from the Utah Military 
Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals 
from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion 
only and by the vote of four judges of the court 
may certify to the Supreme Court for original 
appellate review and determination any matter 
over which the Court of Appeals has original 
appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with 
the requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, 
Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of 
agency adjudicative proceedings. 
Amended by Laws 1994, c. 13; Laws 1995, c. 299, § 47, 
claim to original U.S. Govt, works 
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In subsection (a), the words "who are in the Retired 
Reserve" are substituted for 50:927(a) (last 11 words), 
since section 271 of this title prescribes the conditions 
for being placed in the Retired Reserve. 50:927(b) (last 
sentence) is omitted, since the revised section provides 
that both lists be maintained. 
In subsection (b), the words "containing the names 
placed thereon under section 1202 or 1205 of this title" 
are substituted for the words "upon which shall be 
placed the names of all members of his service entitled 
to such placement pursuant to the provisions of this 
subchapter". 
1958 ACT 
Revised 
section 
1376 
Source (U.S. Code) 
(Uncodified!. 
Source (Statutes at 
Large) 
July 24, 1956, ch. 677, 
5 2 (less clauses (aMi), 
as applicable to 
10:1376). 70 Stat. 623. 
AMENDMENTS 
1994—Pub. L. 103-337 substituted "Temporary dis-
ability retired lists" for "Retired lists" as section 
catchline, struck out "(b)" before "The Secretary con-
cerned", and struck out subsec. (a) which read as fol-
lows: "Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary 
concerned, there shall be maintained retired lists con-
taining the names of the Reserves of the armed forces 
under his jurisdiction who are in the Retired Re-
serve." See section 12774 of this title. 
1958—Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 85-861 struck out provi-
sions requiring publication of the temporary disability 
retired list annually in the official register or other of-
ficial publication of the armed force concerned. 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1994 AMENDMENT 
Amendment by Pub. L. 103-337 effective Dec. 1, 
1994, except as otherwise provided, see section 1691 of 
Pub. L. 103-337, set out as an Effective Date note 
under section 10001 of this title. 
SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS 
This section is referred to in section 1431 of this 
title; title 33 section 857a; title 42 section 213a. 
CHAPTER 71—COMPUTATION OF RETIRED PAY 
Sec. 
1401. 
1401a. 
1402. 
1402a. 
1403. 
1404. 
1405. 
1406. 
1407. 
Computation of retired pay. 
Adjustment of retired pay and retainer pay 
to reflect changes in Consumer Price 
Index. 
Recomputation of retired or retainer pay to 
reflect later active duty of members who 
first became members before September 8, 
1980. 
Recomputation of retired or retainer pay to 
reflect later active duty of members who 
first became members after September 7, 
1980. 
Disability retired pay: treatment under In-
ternal Revenue Code of 1986. 
Applicability of section 8301 of title 5. 
Years of service. 
Retired pay base for members who first 
became members before September 8, 1980: 
final basic pay. 
Retired pay base for members who first 
became members after September 7, 1980: 
high-36 month average. 
Sec. 
1408. Payment of retired or retainer pay in compli-
ance with court orders.1 
1409. Retired pay multiplier. 
1410. Restoral of full retirement amount at age 62 
for members entering on or after August 1, 
1986. 
1411. Rules of construction. 
1412. Rounding to next lower dollar. 
AMENDMENTS 
1987-Pub. L. 100-26, § 7(h)(2)(B), Apr. 21, 1987, 101 
Stat. 282, substituted colon for semicolon and "Inter-
nal Revenue Code of 1986" for "Internal Revenue 
Code of 1954" in item 1403. 
1986-Pub. L. 99-348, title III, § 304(b)(2), July 1, 
1986, 100 Stat. 703, inserted "of members who first 
became members before September 8, 1980" in item 
1402, substituted "Retired pay base for members who 
first became members before September 8, 1980: final 
basic pay" for "Limitations on revocation of retired 
pay" in item 1406 and "Retired pay base for members 
who first became members after September 7, 1980: 
high-36 month average" for "Retired pay base" in 
item 1407, and added items 1409 to 1412. 
1982-Pub. L. 97-252, title X, § 1002(b), Sept. 8, 1982, 
96 Stat. 735, added item 1408. 
1980-Pub. L. 96-513, title V, §511(51)(C), (52KC), 
Dec. 12, 1980, 94 Stat. 2924, 2925, substituted "of mem-
bers who first became members after September 7, 
1980" for "in case of members who first became mem-
bers after the enactment of the Department of De-
fense Authorization Act, 1981" in item 1402a, and sub-
stituted "Internal Revenue Code of 1954" for "title 
26" in item 1403. 
Pub. L. 96-342, title VIII, § 813(a)(2), (b)(3)(B), 94 
Stat. 1101,1104, added items 1402a and 1407. 
1966-Pub. L. 89-718, § 3, Nov. 2, 1966, 80 Stat. 1115, 
substituted "8301" for "47a" in item 1404. 
Pub. L. 89-652, §2(2), Oct. 14, 1966, 80 Stat. 902, 
added item 1406. 
1963-Pub. L. 88-132, § 5(g)(2), Oct. 2, 1963, 77 Stat. 
214, added item 1401a. 
1958-Pub. L. 85-422, § 11(a)(1)(B), May 20. 1958, 72 
Stat. 131, added item 1405. 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Length of service retirement, computation of retired 
pay, see section 1315 of this title. 
Physical disability retirement or separation, compu-
tation of retired pay, see section 1275 of this title. 
Transfer to inactive status list instead of separation, 
see section 1209 of this title. 
CHAPTER REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS 
This chapter is referred to in sections 642, 1209, 
1275, 1315 of this title; title 33 section 857a; title 42 
section 213a. 
§ 1401. Computation of retired pay 
(a) D I S A B I L I T Y , N O N - R E G U L A R SERVICE, W A R -
RANT OFFICER, AND D O P M A R E T I R E M E N T . — T h e 
m o n t h l y ret ired pay of a person ent i t l ed there-
t o under th i s subt i t l e is c o m p u t e d according t o 
t h e fo l lowing table . F o r e a c h case covered by a 
sec t ion of t h i s t i t l e n a m e d in t h e c o l u m n 
h e a d e d "For sect ions", ret ired pay is c o m p u t e d 
by taking , in order, t h e s t eps prescribed oppo-
s i t e it in c o l u m n s 1, 2, 3, a n d 4, as modi f ied by 
t h e appl icable f o o t n o t e s . 
1
 Section catchline amended by Pub. L. 102-190 without corre-
sponding amendment of chapter analysis. 
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For-
mula 
No. 
1 
2 
X * 
u > J 
- j 
1 ' 4 
tt> 
v 5 
fH » 
u
 *> 
For 
sec-
tions 
1201 
1204 
1202 
1205 
580 
1263 
1293 
1305 
633 
634 635 
636 
1251 
Column 1 
Take 
Retired pay base as computed 
under section 1406(b) or 1407. 
Retired pay base as computed 
under section 1406(b) or 1407. 
Retired pay base as computed 
under section 1406(b) or 1407. 
Retired pay base as computed 
under section 1406(b) or 1407. 
Column 2 
Multiply by 
As member elects— 
(1) 2'/.% of years of serv-
ice credited to him under 
section 1208; • or 
(2) the percentage of dis-
ability on date when re-
tired. 
As member elects— 
(1) 2xh% of years of serv-
ice credited to him under 
section 1208. » or 
(2) the percentage of dis-
ability on date when his 
name was placed on tempo-
rary disability retired list. 
The retired pay multiplier 
prescribed in section 
1409(a) for the years of 
service credited to him 
under section 1405. 
The retired pay multiplier 
prescribed in section 
1409(a) for the years of 
service credited to him 
under section 1405. 
Column 3 
Add 
Amount necessary to 
increase product of 
columns 1 and 2 to 
50% of retired pay 
base upon which 
computation is 
based. 
Column 4 
Subtract 
Excess over 75% of 
retired pay base 
upon which 
computation is 
based. 
Excess over 75% of 
retired pay base 
upon which 
computation is 
based. 
1
 Before applying percentage factor, credit each full month of service that is in addition to the number of full years of service 
creditable to the member as one-twelfth of a year and disregard any remaining fractional part of a month. 
Ub) U S E OF MOST FAVORABLE FORMULA.—If a 
person would otherwise be entit led to retired 
pay computed under more than one formula of 
the table in subsection (a) or of any o ther pro-
vision of law, t h e person is entit led to be paid 
under the applicable formula that is most fa-
vorable to him. 
(Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041, 70A S ta t . 106; May 20. 
1958, Pub. L. 85-422, §§6(7), 11(a)(2), 72 S ta t . 
129, 131; Oct. 2, 1963, Pub. L. 88-132, § 5(h)(1), 
77 Stat. 214; Aug. 21, 1965, Pub. L. 89-132, § 6, 
79 Stat. 547; Dec. 16, 1967, Pub. L. 90-207, 
§ 3(1), 81 Stat. 653; Oct. 2, 1972, Pub. L. 92-455, 
§ 1, 86 Stat. 761; Sept. 8, 1980, Pub. L. 96-342, 
title VIII, § 813(b)(1), 94 S ta t . 1102; Dec. 12, 
1980, Pub. L. 96-513, t i t le I, § 113(a), t i t le V, 
§511(49), 94 Stat. 2876, 2924; Sept. 24, 1983, 
Pub. L. 98-94, t i t le IX, §§ 922(a)(1), 923(a)(1), 
(2XA), 97 Stat. 641, 642; Oct. 30, 1984, Pub. L. 
98-557, § 35(b), 98 Stat. 2877; July 1, 1986, Pub. 
L. 99-348, title II, § 201(a), 100 S ta t . 691; Oct. 
23, 1992, Pub. L. 102-484, div. A, t i t le X, 
§ 1052(18), 106 Stat. 2500; Oct. 5, 1994, Pub. L. 
103-337, div. A, t i t le XVI, § 1662(j)(2), 108 S ta t . 
3004.) 
HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES 
HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES—Continued 
Revised 
section 
1401(2) 
1401(3) 
1401(4) 
1401. 
foot-
note 1. 
1401. 
foot-
note 2. 
1401. 
foot-
note 3. 
Source (U.S. Code) 
37:272(d) (1st 29. and 
51st through 55th, 
words, and 4th provi-
so). 
10:1036b (1st 91 words 
and 1st proviso). 
34:440j (1st 91 words 
and 1st proviso). 
10:600/(d) (2d sentence). 
10:600Z(f) (last sen-
tence). 
34:430(d) (2d sentence) 
34:430(f) (last sentence). 
[No source]. 
[No source]. 
37:272(d) (1st proviso); 
10.600/(d) (less 1st and 
2d sentences). 
34:430(d) (less 1st and 
2d sentences). 
Source (Statutes at 
Large) 
May 29. 1954. ch. 249. 
§ 14(d) (less 1st sen-
tence), (f) (1st sen-
tence, less applicabil-
ity to retired grade: 
and last sentence), 68 
Stat. 163. 164. 
Revised 
section 
1401 
• Intro-
duc-
tory 
clause. 
1401(1). 
Source (U.S. Code) 
10:600Kf) (1st sentence, 
less applicability to re-
tired grade). 
34:430(f) (1st sentence, 
less applicability to re-
tired grade). 
37.272(d) (less 1st 55 
words: less 104 th 
through 128th words, 
as applicable to re-
tired grade; and less 
1st. 2d. 4th. 5th. and 
last provisos). 
37:272(e) (1st proviso of 
last sentence). 
Source (Statutes at 
Large) 
June 29. 1948. ch. 708. 
§303 (1st 91 words 
and 1st proviso). 62 
Stat. 1088. 
Oct. 12. 1949. ch. 681, 
§§ 402(d) (less 30th 
through 55th words; 
less 104th through 
128th words, as appli-
cable to retired grade; 
and less 2d. 5th. and 
last provisos). 402(e) (1st proviso of last 
sentence). 63 Stat. 
818. 819. 
In the introductory paragraph, the applicability of 
the rule stated in the third sentence to situations not 
expressly covered by the laws named in the source 
statutes above is a practical construction that the rule 
must be reciprocally applied in all cases. 
In formula No. 1, the words "whichever is earlier", 
in 37:272(d) (clause (2)), are omitted, since they are 
contrary to the rule stated in 37.272(e) (1st proviso of 
last sentence). 
In formula No. 3, the computation is based on 
monthly pay instead of annual pay to conform to the 
other formulas of the revised section. The words 
"basic pay" are substituted for the words "base and 
longevity pay" to conform to the terminology of the 
Career Compensation Act of 1949 (37 U.S.C. 231 et 
seq.). The words "which he would receive if serving, at 
the time granted such pay, on active duty" are omit-
ted as surplusage and to conform to the other formu-
las of the revised section, since the effect of these 
words is covered by footnote l.-The words "at any 
time" are substituted for the words "during his entire 
period of service". 
Footnotes 1 and 2 reflect the long-standing construc-
tion of those provisions dealing with computation of 
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REFERENCES IN TEXT 
Section 1331 of this title, referred to in subsecs. 
(c)'l) and (d)(1), was renumbered section 12731 of this 
title and amended generally by Pub. L. 103-337. div. A. 
title XVI, §1662(j)(l), Oct. 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 2998, 
2999. A new section 1331 was added by section 
1662(j)(7) of Pub. L. 103-337. 
Chapter 67 of this title, referred to in subsec. (d)(1), 
was transferred to part II of subtitle E of this title, re-
numbered as chapter 1223, and amended generally by 
Pub. L. 103-337, div. A, title XVI, § 1662(j)(l), Oct. 5, 
1994, 108 Stat. 2998. A new chapter 67 (§ 1331) of this 
title was added by section 1662(j)(7) of Pub. L. 
103-337. 
PRIOR PROVISIONS 
A prior section 1407, added Pub. L. 96-342, title VIII, 
§ 813(a)(1), Sept. 8, 1980, 94 Stat. 1100; amended Pub. 
L. 96-513, title I, § 113(c), title V, §§501(21), 511(53), 
Dec. 12, 1980, 94 Stat. 2877, 2908, 2925, related to de-
termination of retired base pay, prior to repeal by 
Pub. L. 99-348, § 104(b). 
AMENDMENTS 
1994—Subsec. (c)(2)(B). Pub. L. 103-337, 
§ 1662(j)(5)(A), which directed substitution of "chap-
ter 1223" for "chapter 67", could not be executed be-
cause the words "chapter 67" did not appear subse-
quent to amendment by Pub. L. 101-189, § 651(a)(2), 
(4). See 1989 Amendment note below. 
Subsec. (f)(2). Pub. L. 103-337, § 1662(j)(5)(B), which 
directed amendment of subsec. (f)(2) by substituting 
"Chapter 1223" for "Chapter 67" in heading and "sec-
tion 12731" for "section 1331" in text, could not be ex-
ecuted because of previous repeal of subsec. (f) by 
Pub. L. 101-189, § 651(a)(2). See 1989 Amendment note 
below. 
1989—Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 101-189, § 651(a)(1), (b)(2), 
substituted "person" for "member", "person's" for 
"members", and "subsection (c) or (d)" for "subsec-
tion (c)". 
Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 101-189, § 651(a)(2), (4), added 
subsec. (c) and struck out former subsec. (c) which re-
lated to computation of high-three average. 
Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 101-189, § 651(a)(4), added 
subsec. (d). Former subsec. (d) redesignated (e). 
Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 101-189, § 651(a)(2), (3), redesig-
nated subsec. (d) as (e) and struck out former subsec. 
(e) which related to special rules for short-term dis-
ability retirees. 
Subsecs. (f), (g). Pub. L. 101-189, § 651(a)(2), struck 
out subsec. (f) which related to special rule for mem-
bers retiring with non-regular service, and subsec. (g) 
which defined the term "years of creditable service". 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1994 AMENDMENT 
Amendment by Pub. L. 103-337 effective Dec. 1, 
1994, except as otherwise provided, see section 1691 of 
Pub. L. 103-337, set out as an Effective Date note 
under section 10001 of this title. 
SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS 
This section is referred to in sections 1401, 1402a, 
3991, 3992, 6151, 6333, 6334, 8991, 8992, 12739 of this 
title; title 14 sections 357, 423, 424; title 33 section 
853o; title 42 sections 211, 212. 
§ 1408. Payment of retired or retainer pay in compli-
ance with court orders 
(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: , 
(1) The term "court" means— 
(A) any court of competent jurisdiction of 
any State, the District of Columbia, the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, 
American Samoa, the Virgin Islands, the 
Northern Mariana Islands, and the Trust 
Territory of the Pacific Islands; 
(B) any court of the United States (as de-
fined in section 451 of title 28) having com-
petent jurisdiction; and 
(C) any court of competent jurisdiction of 
a foreign country with which the United 
States has an agreement requiring the 
United States to honor any court order of 
such country. 
(2) The term "court order" means a final 
decree of divorce, dissolution, annulment, or 
legal separation issued by a court, or a court 
ordered, ratified, or approved property settle-
ment incident to such a decree (including a 
final decree modifying the terms of a previ-
ously issued decree of divorce, dissolution, an-
nulment, or legal separation, or a court or-
dered, ratified, or approved property settle-
ment incident to such previously issued 
decree), which— 
(A) is issued in accordance with the laws 
of the jurisdiction of that court; 
(B) provides for— 
(i) payment of child support (as defined 
in section 462(b) of the Social Security 
Act (42 U.S.C. 662(b))); 
(ii) payment of alimony (as defined in 
section 462(c) of the Social Security Act 
(42 U.S.C. 662(c))); or 
(iii) division of property (including a di-
vision of community property); and 
(C) in the case of a division of property, 
specifically provides for the payment of an 
amount, expressed in dollars or as a per-
centage of disposable retired pay, from the 
disposable retired pay of a member to the 
spouse or former spouse of that member. 
(3) The term "final decree" means a decree 
from which no appeal may be taken or from 
which no appeal has been taken within the 
time allowed for taking such appeals under 
the laws applicable to such appeals, or a 
decree from which timely appeal has been 
taken and such appeal has been finally decid-
ed under the laws applicable to such appeals. 
(4) The term "disposable retired pay" 
means the total monthly retired pay to which 
a'member is entitled less amounts which— 
(A) are owed by that member to the 
United States for previous overpayments of 
retired pay and for recoupments required 
by law resulting from entitlement to retired 
pay; 
(B) are deducted from the retired pay of 
such member as a result of forfeitures of re-
tired pay ordered by a court-martial or as a 
result of a waiver of retired pay required by 
law in order to receive compensation under 
title 5 or title 38; 
(C) in the case of a member entitled to re-
tired pay under chapter 61 of this title, are 
equal to the amount of retired pay of the 
member under that chapter computed using 
the percentage of the member's disability 
on the date when the member was retired 
(or the date on which the member's name 
was placed on the temporary disability re-
tired list); or 
(D) are deducted because of an election 
under chapter 73 of this title to provide an 
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annuity to a spouse or former spouse to 
whom payment of a portion of such mem-
ber's retired pay is being made pursuant to 
a court order under this section. 
(5) The term "member" includes a former 
member entitled to retired pay under section 
1331 l of this title. 
(6) The term "spouse or former spouse" 
means the husband or wife, or former hus-
band or wife, respectively, of a member who, 
on or before the date of a court order, was 
married to t ha t member. 
(7) The term "retired pay" includes retainer 
pay. 
(b) EFFECTIVE SERVICE OF PROCESS.—For the 
purposes of this section— 
(1) service of a court order is effective if— 
(A) an appropriate agent of the Secretary 
concerned designated for receipt of service 
of court orders under regulations prescribed 
pursuant to subsection (i) or, if^no agent 
has been so designated, the Secretary con-
cerned, is personally served or is served by 
certified or registered mail, re turn receipt 
requested; 
(B) t h e court order is regular on its face; 
(C) t he court order or other documents 
served with the court order identify the 
member concerned and include, if possible, 
the social security number of such member; 
and 
(D) the court order or other documents 
served with t he court order certify t h a t the 
rights of the member under t he Soldiers' 
and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 (50 
U.S.C. App. 501 et seq.) were observed; and 
(2) a court order is regular on its face if t he 
order— 
(A) is issued by a court of competent juris-
diction; 
(B) is legal in form; and 
(C) includes nothing on its face t ha t pro-
vides reasonable notice t ha t it is issued 
without author i ty of law. 
(c) AUTHORITY FOR COURT To TREAT RETIRED 
PAY AS PROPERTY OF THE MEMBER AND SPOUSE.— 
(1) Subject to the limitations of this section, a 
court may t rea t disposable retired pay payable 
to a member for pay periods beginning after 
June 25, 1981, ei ther as property solely of the 
member or as property of the member and his 
spouse in accordance with the law of the juris-
diction of such court. A court may not t rea t re-
tired pay as property in any proceeding to 
divide or parti t ion any amount of retired pay of 
a member as the property of the member and 
the member's spouse or former spouse if a final 
decree of divorce, dissolution, annulment , or 
legal separation (including a court ordered, rati-
fied, or approved property set t lement incident 
to such decree) affecting the member and the 
member's spouse or former spouse (A) was 
issued before June 25, 1981, and (B) did not 
treat (or reserve jurisdiction to t reat) any 
amount of retired pay of the member as proper-
ty of the member and the member 's spouse or 
former spouse. 
1
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(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of 
law, this section does not create any right, title, 
or interest which can be sold, assigned, trans-
ferred, or otherwise disposed of (including by 
inheritance) by a spouse or former spouse. Pay-
ments by the Secretary concerned under sub-
section (d) to a spouse or former spouse with re-
spect to a division of retired pay as the proper-
ty of a member and the member 's spouse under 
this subsection may not be treated as amounts 
received as retired pay for service in the uni-
formed services. 
(3) This section does not authorize any court 
to order a member to apply for ret i rement or 
retire at a particular time in order to effectuate 
any payment under this section. 
(4) A court may not t rea t t he disposable re-
tired pay of a member in the manner described 
in paragraph (1) unless t he court has jurisdic-
tion over the member by reason of (A) his resi-
dence, o ther t han because of military assign-
ment, in the territorial jurisdiction of the court, 
(B) his domicile in the territorial jurisdiction of 
the court, or (C) his consent to the jurisdiction 
of the court. 
(d) PAYMENTS BY SECRETARY CONCERNED To 
SPOUSE OR FORMER SPOUSE.—(1) After effective 
service on the Secretary concerned of a court 
order providing for the payment of child sup-
port or alimony or, with respect to a division of 
property, specifically providing for the pay-
ment of an amount of the disposable retired 
pay from a member to the spouse or a former 
spouse of the member, the Secretary shall 
make payments (subject to the limitations of 
this section) from the disposable retired pay of 
the member to the spouse or former spouse in 
an amount sufficient to satisfy the amount of 
child support and alimony set forth in the 
court order and, with respect to a division of 
property, in the amount of disposable retired 
pay specifically provided for in the court order. 
In the case of a member entitled to receive re-
tired pay on the date of the effective service of 
the court order, such payments shall begin not 
later t han 90 days after the date of effective 
service. In the case of a member not entitled to 
receive retired pay on the date of the effective 
service of the court order, such payments shall 
begin not later than 90 days after the date on 
which the member first becomes entitled to re-
ceive retired pay. 
(2) If the spouse or former spouse to whom 
payments are to be made under this section was 
not married to the member for a period of 10 
years or more during which the member per-
formed at least 10 years of service creditable in 
determining the member 's eligibility for retired 
pay, payments may not be made under this sec-
tion to the extent t h a t they include an amount 
resulting from the t rea tment by the court 
under subsection (c) of disposable retired pay of 
the member as property of the member or 
property of the member and his spouse. 
(3) Payments under this section shall not be 
made more frequently t han once each month , 
and the Secretary concerned shall not be re-
quired to vary normal pay and disbursement 
cycles for retired pay in order to comply with a 
court order. 
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(4) Payments from the disposable retired pay 
of a member pursuant to this section shall ter-
minate in accordance with the terms of the ap-
plicable court order, but not later than the date 
of the death of the member or the date of the 
death of the spouse or former spouse to whom 
payments are being made, whichever occurs 
first. 
(5) If a court order described in paragraph (1) 
provides for a division of property (including a 
division of community property) in addition to 
an amount of child support or alimony or the 
payment of an amount of disposable retired 
pay as the result of the courts treatment of 
such pay under subsection (c) as property of 
the member and his spouse, the Secretary con-
cerned shall pay (subject to the limitations of 
this section) from the disposable retired pay of 
the member to the spouse or former spouse of 
the member, any part of the amount payable to 
the spouse or former spouse under the division 
of property upon effective service of a final 
court order of garnishment of such amount 
from such retired pay. 
(e) LIMITATIONS.—(1) The total amount of the 
disposable retired pay of a member payable 
under all court orders pursuant to subsection 
(c) may not exceed 50 percent of such dispos-
able retired pay. 
(2) In the event of effective service of more 
than one court order which provide for pay-
ment to a spouse and one or more former 
spouses or to more than one former spouse, the 
disposable retired pay of the member shall be 
used to satisfy (subject to the limitations of 
paragraph (1)) such court orders on a first-
come, first-served basis. Such court orders shall 
be satisfied (subject to the limitations of para-
graph (1)) out of that amount of disposable re-
tired pay which remains after the satisfaction 
of all court orders which have been previously 
served. 
(3)(A) In the event of effective service of con-
flicting court orders under this section which 
assert to direct that different amounts be paid 
during a month to the same spouse or former 
spouse of the same member, the Secretary con-
cerned shall— 
(i) pay to that spouse from the member's 
disposable retired pay the least amount di-
rected to be paid during that month by any 
such conflicting court order, but not more 
than the amount of disposable retired pay 
which remains available for payment of such 
court orders based on when such court orders 
were effectively served and the limitations of 
paragraph (1) and subparagraph (B) of para-
graph (4); 
(rixretain an amount of disposable retired 
pay maf is equal to the lesser of— 
(I) the difference between the largest 
amount required by any conflicting court 
order to be paid to the spouse or former 
spouse and the amount payable to the 
spouse or former spouse under clause (i); 
and 
(II) the amount of disposable retired pay 
which remains available for payment of any 
conflicting court order based on when such 
court order was effectively served and the 
limitations of paragraph (1) and subpara-
graph (B) of paragraph (4); and 
(iii) pay to that member the amount which 
is equal to the amount of that member's dis-
posable retired pay (less any amount paid 
during such month pursuant to legal process 
served under section 459 of the Social Securi-
ty Act (42 U.S.C. 659) and any amount paid 
during such month pursuant to court orders 
effectively served under this section, other 
than such conflicting court orders) minus— 
(I) the amount of disposable retired pay 
paid under clause (i); and 
(II) the amount of disposable retired pay 
retained under clause (ii). 
(B) The Secretary concerned shall hold the 
amount retained under clause (ii) of subpara-
graph (A) until such time as that Secretary is 
provided with a court order which has been cer-
tified by the member and the spouse or former 
spouse to be valid and applicable to the re-
tained amount. Upon being provided with such 
an order, the Secretary shall pay the retained 
amount in accordance with the order. 
(4)(A) In the event of effective service of a 
court order under this section and the service 
of legal process pursuant to section 459 of the 
Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 659), both of 
which provide for payments during a month 
from the same member, satisfaction of such 
court orders and legal process from the retired 
pay of the member shall be on a first-come, 
first-served basis. Such court orders and legal 
process shall be satisfied out of moneys which 
are subject to such orders and legal process and 
which remain available in accordance with the 
limitations of paragraph (1) and subparagraph 
(B) of this paragraph during such month after 
the satisfaction of all court orders or legal proc-
ess which have been previously served. 
(B) Notwithstanding any other provision of 
law, the total amount of the disposable retired 
pay of a member payable by the Secretary con-
cerned under all court orders pursuant to this 
section and all legal processes pursuant to sec-
tion 459 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 
659) with respect to a member may not exceed 
65 percent of the amount of the retired pay 
payable to such member that is considered 
under section 462 of the Social Security Act (42 
U.S.C. 662) to be remuneration for employment 
that is payable by the United States. 
(5) A court order which itself or because of 
previously served court orders provides for the 
payment of an amount which exceeds the 
amount of disposable retired pay available for 
payment because of the limit set forth in para-
graph (1), or which, because of previously 
served court orders or legal process previously 
served under section 459 of the Social Security 
Act (42 U.S.C. 659), provides for payment of an 
amount that exceeds the maximum amount 
permitted under paragraph (1) or subparagraph 
(B) of paragraph (4), shall not be considered to 
be irregular on its face solely for that reason. 
However, such order shall be considered to be 
fully satisfied for purposes of this section by 
the payment to the spouse or former spouse of 
the maximum amount of disposable retired pay 
permitted under paragraph (1) and subpara-
graph (B) of paragraph (4). 
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(6) Nothing in this section shall be construed 
to relieve a member of liability for the payment 
of alimony, child support, or other payments 
required by a court order on the grounds that 
payments made out of disposable retired pay 
under this section have been made in the maxi-
mum amount permitted under paragraph (1) or 
subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4). Any such 
unsatisfied obligation of a member may be en-
forced by any means available under law other 
than the means provided under this section in 
any case in which the maximum amount per-
mitted under paragraph (1) has been paid and 
under section 459 of the Social Security Act (42 
U.S.C. 659) in any case in which the maximum 
amount permitted under subparagraph (B) of 
paragraph (4) has been paid. 
(f) IMMUNITY OF OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF 
UNITED STATES.—(1) The United States and any 
officer or employee of the United States shall 
not be liable with respect to any payment made 
from retired pay to any member, spouse, or 
former spouse pursuant to a court order that is 
regular on its face if such payment is made in 
accordance with this section and the regula-
tions prescribed pursuant to subsection (i). 
(2) An officer or employee of the United 
States who, under regulations prescribed pursu-
ant to subsection (i), has the duty to respond to 
interrogatories shall not be subject under any 
law to any disciplinary action or civil or crimi-
nal liability or penalty for, or because of, any 
disclosure of information made by him in carry-
ing out any of his duties which directly or indi-
rectly pertain to answering such interrogato-
ries. 
(g) NOTICE To MEMBER OF SERVICE OF COURT 
ORDER O N SECRETARY CONCERNED.—A person re-
ceiving effective service of a court order under 
this section shall, as soon as possible, but not 
later than 30 days after the date on which ef-
fective service is made, send a written notice of 
such court order (together with a copy of such 
order) to the member affected by the court 
order at his last known address. 
(h) BENEFITS FOR DEPENDENTS WHO ARE VIC-
TIMS OF ABUSE BY MEMBERS LOSING RIGHT TO 
RETIRED PAY.—(1) If, in the case of a member or 
former member of the armed forces referred to 
in paragraph (2)(A), a court order provides (in 
the manner applicable to a division of property) 
for the payment of an amount from the dispos-
able retired pay of that member or former 
member (as certified under paragraph (4)) to 
an eligible spouse or former spouse of that 
member or former member, the Secretary con-
cerned, beginning upon effective service of such 
court order, shall pay that amount in accord-
ance with this subsection to such spouse or 
former spouse. 
(2) A spouse or former spouse of a member or 
former member of the armed forces is eligible 
to receive payment under this subsection if— 
(A) the member or former member, while a 
member of the armed forces and after becom-
ing eligible to be retired from the armed 
forces on the basis of years of service, has eli-
gibility to receive retired pay terminated as a 
result of misconduct while a member involv-
ing abuse of a spouse or dependent child (as 
defined in regulations prescribed by the Sec-
retary of Defense or, for the Coast Guard 
when it is not operating as a service in the 
Navy, by the Secretary of Transportation); 
and 
(B) the spouse or former spouse— 
(i) was the victim of the abuse and was 
married to the member or former member 
at the time of that abuse; or 
(ii) is a natural or adopted parent of a de-
pendent child of the member or former 
member who was the victim of the £(&£&**» 
(3) The amount certified by the Secretary 
concerned under paragraph (4) with respect to 
a member or former member of the armed 
forces referred to in paragraph (2)(A) shall be 
deemed to be the disposable retired pay of that 
member or former member for the purposes of 
this subsection. 
(4) Upon the request of a court or an eligible 
spouse or former spouse of a member or former 
member of the armed forces referred to in 
paragraph (2)(A) in connection with a civil 
action for the issuance of a court order in the 
case of that member or former member, the 
Secretary concerned shall determine and certi-
fy the amount of the monthly retired pay that 
the member or former member would have 
been entitled to receive as of the date of the 
certification— 
(A) if the member or former member's eligi-
bility for retired pay had not been terminated 
as described in paragraph (2)(A); and 
(B) if, in the case of a member or former 
member not in receipt of retired pay immedi-
ately before that termination of eligibility for 
retired pay, the member or former member 
had retired on the effective date of that ter-
mination of eligibility. 
(5) A court order under this subsection may 
provide that whenever retired pay is increased 
under section 1401a of this title (or any other 
provision of law), the amount payable under 
the court order to the spouse or former spouse 
of a member or former member described in 
paragraph (2)(A) shall be increased at the same 
time by the percent by which the retired pay of 
the member or former member would have 
been increased if the member or former 
member were receiving retired pay. 
(6) Notwithstanding any other provision of 
law, a member or former member of the armed 
forces referred to in paragraph (2)(A) shall 
have no ownership interest in, or claim against, 
any amount payable under this section to a 
spouse or former spouse of the member or 
former member. 
(7)(A) If a former spouse receiving payments 
under this subsection with respect to a member 
or former member referred to in paragraph 
(2)(A) marries again after such payments begin, 
the eligibility of the former spouse to receive 
further payments under this subsection shall 
terminate on the date of such marriage. 
(B) A person's eligibility to receive payments 
under this subsection that is terminated under 
subparagraph (A) by reason of remarriage shall 
be resumed in the event of the termination of 
that marriage by the death of that person's 
spouse or by annulment or divorce. The re-
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sumption of payments shall begin as of the first 
day of the month in which that marriage is so 
terminated. The monthly amount of the pay-
ments shall be the amount that would have 
been paid if the continuity of the payments 
had not been interrupted by the marriage. 
(8) Payments in accordance with this subsec-
tion shall be made out of funds in the Depart-
ment of Defense Military Retirement Fund es-
tablished by section 1461 of this title or, in the 
case of the Coast Guard, out of funds appropri-
ated to the Department of Transportation for 
payment of retired pay for the Coast Guard. 
(9)(A) A spouse or former spouse of a member 
or former member of the armed forces referred 
to in paragraph (2)(A), while receiving pay-
ments in accordance with this subsection, shall 
be entitled to receive medical and dental care, 
to use commissary and exchange stores, and to 
receive any other benefit that a spouse or a 
former spouse of a retired member of the 
armed forces is entitled to receive on the basis 
of being a spouse or former spouse, as the case 
may be, of a retired member of the armed 
forces in the same manner as if the member or 
former member referred to in paragraph (2)(A) 
was entitled to retired pay. 
(B) A dependent child of a member or former 
member referred to in paragraph (2XA) who 
was a member of the household of the member 
or former member at the time of the miscon-
duct described in paragraph (2)(A) shall be en-
titled to receive medical and dental care, to use 
commissary and exchange stores, and to have 
other benefits provided to dependents of re-
tired members of the armed forces in the same 
manner as if the member or former member re-
ferred to in paragraph (2)(A) was entitled to re-
tired pay. 
(C) If a spouse or former spouse or a depend-
ent child eligible or entitled to receive a par-
ticular benefit under this paragraph is eligible 
or entitled to receive that benefit under an-
other provision of law, the eligibility or entitle-
ment of that spouse or former spouse or de-
pendent child to such benefit shall be deter-
mined under such other provision of law in-
stead of this paragraph. 
(10XA) For purposes of this subsection, in the 
case of a member of the armed forces who has 
been sentenced by a court-martial to receive a 
punishment that will terminate the eligibility 
of that member to receive retired pay if execut-
ed, the eligibility of that member to receive re-
tired pay may, as determined by the Secretary 
concerned, be considered terminated effective 
upon the approval of that sentence by the 
persori1*K*ji!*&ninder section 860(c) of this title 
(article 60(c) of the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice). 
(B) If each form of the punishment that 
would result in the termination of eligibility to 
receive retired pay is later remitted, set aside, 
or mitigated to a punishment that does not 
result in the termination of that eligibility, a 
payment of benefits to the eligible recipient 
under this subsection that is based on the pun-
ishment so vacated, set aside, or mitigated shall 
cease. The cessation of payments shall be effec-
tive as of the first day of the first month fol-
lowing the month in which the Secretary con-
cerned notifies the recipient of such benefits in 
writing that payment of the benefits will cease. 
The recipient may not be required to repay the 
benefits received before that effective date 
(except to the extent necessary to recoup any 
amount that was erroneous when paid). 
(11) In this subsection, the term "dependent 
child", with respect to a member or former 
member of the armed forces referred to in 
paragraph (2)(A), means an unmarried legiti-
mate child, including an adopted child or a 
stepchild of the member or former member, 
who— 
(A) is under 18 years of age; 
(B) is incapable of self-support because of a 
mental or physical incapacity that existed 
before becoming 18 years of age and is de-
pendent on the member or former member 
for over one-half of the child's support; or 
(C) if enrolled in a full-time course of study 
in an institution of higher education recog-
nized by the Secretary of Defense for the 
purposes of this subparagraph, is under 23 
years of age and is dependent on the member 
or former member for over one-half of the 
child's support. 
(i) REGULATIONS.—The Secretaries concerned 
shall prescribe uniform regulations for the ad-
ministration of this section. 
(Added Pub. L. 97-252, title X, § 1002(a), Sept. 
8, 1982, 96 Stat. 730; amended Pub. L. 98-525, 
title VI, §643(a)-(d), Oct. 19, 1984, 98 Stat. 
2547; Pub. L. 99-661, div. A, title VI, § 644(a), 
Nov. 14, 1986, 100 Stat. 3887; Pub. L. 100-26, 
§§ 3(3), 7(h)(1), Apr. 21, 1987, 101 Stat. 273, 282; 
Pub. L. 101-189, div. A, title VI, § 653(a)(5), title 
XVI, § 1622(e)(6), Nov. 29, 1989, 103 Stat. 1462, 
1605; Pub. L. 101-510, div. A, title V, 
§ 555(a)-(d), (f), (g), Nov. 5, 1990, 104 Stat. 1569, 
1570; Pub. L. 102-190, div. A, title X, 
§ 1061(a)(7), Dec. 5, 1991, 105 Stat. 1472; Pub. L. 
102-484, div. A, title VI, § 653(a), Oct. 23, 1992, 
106 Stat. 2426; Pub. L. 103-160, div. A, title V, 
§ 555(a), (b), title XI, § 1182(a)(2), Nov. 30, 1993, 
107 Stat. 1666, 1771.) 
REFERENCES IN TEXT 
Section 1331 of this title, referred to in subsec. 
(a)(5), was renumbered section 12731 of this title and 
amended generally by Pub. L. 103-337, div. A, title 
XVI, § 1662(j)(l), Oct. 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 2998, 2999. A 
new section 1331 was added by section 1662(j)(7) of 
Pub. L. 103-337. 
The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act, referred 
to in subsec. (b)(1)(D), is act Oct. 17, 1940, ch. 888, 54 
Stat. 1178, as amended, which is classified to section 
501 et seq. of the Appendix to Title 50, War and Na-
tional Defense. For complete classification of this Act 
to the Code, see section 501 of the Appendix to Title 
50 and Tables. 
AMENDMENTS 
4993—Subsecs. (b)(1)(A), (f)(1), (2). Pub. L. 103-160, 
§ 1182(a)(2)(A), substituted "subsection (i)" for "sub-
section (h)". 
Subsec. (h)(2)(A). Pub. L. 103-160, § 555(b)(1), insert-
ed "or, for the Coast Guard when it is not operating as 
a service in the Navy, by the Secretary of Transporta-
tion" after "Secretary of Defense". 
Subsec. (h)(4)(B). Pub. L. 103-160, § 1182(a)(2)(B), 
inserted "of" after "of that termination". 
EXHIBIT A 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (Bar No. 0899) 
of and for 
COHNE. RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
525 East First South. Fifth Floor 
P.O.Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Attorney for Respondent 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR WEBER COUNTY, 
OGDEN DEPARTMENT. STATE OF UTAH 
DIANA CHILDS (flea Diana Callahan), ; 
Petitioner, ] 
v. ] 
WILLIAM K. CALLAHAN, ; 
Respondent, ) 
) ORDER 
) (December 1,1998 Hearing) 
) Civil No. 820980786 
) Judge: Roger S. Dutson 
The above-captioned matter came before the Court, the Honorable Roger S. Dutson 
presiding, on Tuesday, the 1st day of December, 1998. The Petitioner was present in person and 
represented by counsel, Neil B. Crist. The Respondent was present is person and represented by 
counsel, David S. Dolowitz. The Court, after hearing the arguments and representations of 
counsel and having had the opportunity to review the written submittals, including the affidavits 
submitted by the Petitioner and the legal authority submitted by each of the parties, finds and 
determines that there are no relevant factual disputes in this matter as the Respondent has filed a 
Motion to Dismiss and, therefore, admits for the purpose of that motion all facts alleged by the 
Petitioner are true, that the argument of the Petitioner that she did not know she had a right to 
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assert a claim against the military retirement of the Respondent in 1982 or 1985 (the years in 
which she appeared before the Court) is not a basis for a claim asserted in 1998, fifteen years 
after the Decree of Divorce was entered and thirteen years after she has appeared before the 
Court and requested a modification of the decree, that the Petitioner has presented no evidence of 
a substantial change in circumstances factually, that the Utah Court of Appeals in Toone v. 
Toone. 952 P.2d 112 (Utah App. 1998) has established the law in Utah that a change in law is not 
enough to constitute a substantial change of circumstances justifying the reopening of a decree of 
divorce, that no other facts have been presented to the Court which would support a finding of a 
substantial change in the circumstances of the parties, that while it is true that when the Decree of 
Divorce was granted in 1982, because of the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in McCarty v. 
McCarty 453 U.S. 210 (1981), which decision was, in effect, reversed by the Congress of the 
United States when it passed Public Law 97-252, commonly referred to as the Uniform Services 
Former Spouse's Protection Act which permitted parties who had been divorced between the 
rendering of the McCarty decision in 1981 and the passage of the law in 1983 either to return to 
court or, if they were in court, to make claims for military retirement that had been accumulated 
during the marriage, if state law permitted such an action, that more than thirteen years had 
passed since the last hearing in this case and the primary basis on which the Petitioner asserts her 
claim is of the Uniform Services Former Spouse's Protection Act which has been existence in the 
thirteen years since this matter was last heard, and that the Petitioner's strongest argument is the 
change in Federal statutes. The policy of res judicata is to put all issues that have been or could 
have been presented to the court to rest and, based on these factors, the Court concludes that, 
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pursuant to the ruling of the Utah Court of Appeals in Toone v. Toone, 952 P.2d 112 (Utah App. 
1998) and the principals of res judicata, the Respondent's motion to dismiss should be granted. 
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the 
Respondent's motion to dismiss the Petitioner's petition to modify the decree of divorce is 
granted and that petition is dismissed^ 
DATED this / / day of Jj-e^~ , 1998. 
BY THE G 
ROGER S/DUTSON 
Second Judicial District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS REFLECTING THE 
RULING OF THE COURT: 
<7 
NEIL B. CRIST 
Attorney for Petitioner 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
Attorney for Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of COHNE, 
RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C., 525 East 100 South, Suite 500, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, and 
that on the ; day of^fcZ^ag*- , 1998,1 caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing [Proposed] Order (December 1,1998 Hearing)to be served, via U.S. Mail, postage 
prepaid, upon: 
Neil B. Crist 
380 North 200 West, Suite 260 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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IN THE SECOND J U D I C I A L D I S T R I C T CdNIiT^rflF WEBER COUNTY, 
STATE OF. CJTAH 
CiAcJj 
DIANA CALLAHAN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WILLIAM K. CALLAHAN, 
Defendant. ) Civil No. 80786 
The above-entitled matter was heard before the above-
entitled Court on the 5th day of March, 1982, the Honorable Calvin 
Gould presiding. The plaintiff was personally present and 
represented by her counsel, Ann Parker Judd; the defendant was 
not present, nor was he represented by counsel. The plaintiff 
was sworn and testified in support of the allegations appearing 
in her Complaint and the written Stipulation and Agreement of the 
parties was presented to the Court. The Court having entered its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and being fully advised 
in the premises, now, 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES AS FOLLOWS: 
1. The plaintiff is awarded a decree of divorce 
divorcing her from the defendant, which divorce shall become final 
and absolute upon the signing and entry of the divorce decree. 
2. The plaintiff waives the payment of alimony. 
3. The plaintiff is awarded the care, custody and con-
trol of the minor children, to-wit: Nicki Leona Callahan, age 
ten (10) years, and Traci Elease Callahan, age eight *(8) years. 
The defendant is granted the right of reasonable visitation upon 
the giviay oi cwenuy-four hours notice to the plaintiff. The 
defendant is granted up to forty-five days extended visitation 
during the summer months upon the giving of two weeks notice to the 
plaintiff of his intent to exercise said summer visitation. The 
plaintiff is granted reasonable rights of visitation during the 
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defendant's extended summer visitation. 
4. The defendant is ordered to pay to the plaintiff 
the sum of $152.00 per month per child as child support for a 
total child support obligation of $304.00 per month, to be payable 
through the Clerk, of the above named Court, and to commence with 
the month of March, 1982. 
5. The defendant is ordered to help the plaintiff 
with one-half the cost of Christmas and school clothes for the 
minor children. 
6. The plaintiff is awarded the following described 
properties; 
a. The real property and premises at 568 Fowler, 
Ogden, Utah, subject to the mortgage and utility payments due 
which the plaintiff will assume and pay saving the defendant 
harmless therefrom, and, subject to a non-interest bearing 
Judgment Lien to the favor of the defendant in the sum of seven 
hundred and fifty dollars ($750.00). The Judgment Lien will be 
payable to the defendant within a reasonable time following the 
earliest occurrence of the plaintiff's remarriage, her sale of the 
property and premises or within two years of the finalization of 
the divorce. If the seven hundred and fifty dollars ($750.00) is 
due because of the passage of two years, three hundred and seventy 
five dollars ($375.00) is due within three (3) months and the 
remaining three hundred and fifty dollars ($350.00) is due within 
the next three (3) months. 
b. The household furniture, furnishings, fixtures 
and equipment now in her possession, with the exception of the 
ice chest, the carved Teak chest and the Peacock chair; and the 
Mommasan chair and footstool. 
c. The 1979 Honda Civic automobile, subject to 
any mortgage payments thereon. 
d. The savings account. 
e. Her personal effects. 
7. The defendant is awarded the following described 
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a. The seven hundred and fifty dollar ($750.00) 
Judgment Lien, subject to the above mentioned conditions. 
b. The 1974 Maverick automobile, subject to any 
payments thereon. 
c. The furniture presently in his possession, the 
ice chest, the carved Teak Chest and the Peacock chair. The 
Mommasan Chair and the footstool will go to the plaintiff. 
8. The plaintiff is ordered to assume and be respon-
sible for the home improvement loan payments and the debts and 
obligations incurred by her subsequent to the separation of the 
parties. 
9. The defendant is ordered to assume and be responsible 
for the debt on the Fiat automobile, the Master Charge debt and 
his separate debts and obligations incurred subsequent to the 
separation of the parties. 
10. When the minor children reach the age of twelve 
(12) years, they may decide whether they will live with the 
plaintiff or the defendant. 
11. If the plaintiff moves from the Weber County area, 
she is ordered to give the defendant a thrity (30) day written 
notice of her new address and telephone number. 
12. The defendant is ordered to maintain the minor 
children as beneficiaries on his life insurance policy. 
13. The plaintiff is ordered to maintain health and 
accident insurance on the minor children if it is obtainable 
through her place of employment. The defendant is ordered to 
assume and be responsible for one-half of the yearly insurance 
deductible for each minor child. If the twenty percent (20%) of 
the medical costs which the insurance company does not pay should 
exceed $100.00 for the year, the defendant will share all costs 
over $100.00 for each child. 
14. The child support of $304.00 is based upon the 
defendant's representation to the plaintiff that he has gross 
earnings of $1,N')0.00 per month. 
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15. The plaintiff may claim the minor child, Nicki, 
and the defendant may claim the minor child, Traci, as exemptions 
for income tax purposes. 
16. The defendant is ordered responsible for one-half 
of plaintiff's attorney's fees in the amount of $175.00. 
DATED this j Q day of March, 1982. 
CAI? flN OTULD^DistAxct C o u r t TTudge 
LA.v o f F IC6 
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